Daily Papers

As large language model (LLM) agents become increasingly autonomous, they may pursue task performance through deception, raising concerns about their reliable deployment. Existing evaluations show that LLM agents can deceive, but often examine isolated scenarios or narrowly defined conditions, limiting systematic understanding of when deception becomes more likely. To address this gap, we introduce DecepEval, a benchmark comprising 1,532 instances across 3 task families and 28 professional scenarios. Drawing on classical fraud theories, we propose the LLM Deception Diamond framework, which characterizes four external conditions that may induce deception: pressure, incentive, opportunity, and conflict. DecepEval pairs neutral and induced versions of each instance to measure condition-dependent changes in deception rates, while explicit task facts and observable agent behavior help distinguish deception from capability-related errors. Evaluations of nine frontier LLMs show that inducements increase deception across models and task families, even among models with low baseline deception rates. DecepEval makes these vulnerabilities measurable, providing a shared benchmark for progress toward trustworthy artificial intelligence.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across diverse tasks, but they remain susceptible to hallucinations--generating content that appears plausible but contains factual inaccuracies. We present Finch-Zk, a black-box framework that leverages fine-grained cross-model consistency to detect and mitigate hallucinations in LLM outputs without requiring external knowledge sources. Finch-Zk introduces two key innovations: 1) a cross-model consistency checking strategy that reveals fine-grained inaccuracies by comparing responses generated by diverse models from semantically-equivalent prompts, and 2) a targeted mitigation technique that applies precise corrections to problematic segments while preserving accurate content. Experiments on the FELM dataset show Finch-Zk improves hallucination detection F1 scores by 6-39\% compared to existing approaches. For mitigation, Finch-Zk achieves up to 9 absolute percentage points improvement in answer accuracy on the GPQA-diamond dataset when applied to state-of-the-art models like Llama 4 Maverick and Claude 4 Sonnet. Extensive evaluation on multiple datasets demonstrates that Finch-Zk provides a practical, deployment-ready safeguard for enhancing factual reliability in production LLM systems.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.

We investigate strategic deception in large language models using two complementary testbeds: Secret Agenda (across 38 models) and Insider Trading compliance (via SAE architectures). Secret Agenda reliably induced lying when deception advantaged goal achievement across all model families. Analysis revealed that autolabeled SAE features for "deception" rarely activated during strategic dishonesty, and feature steering experiments across 100+ deception-related features failed to prevent lying. Conversely, insider trading analysis using unlabeled SAE activations separated deceptive versus compliant responses through discriminative patterns in heatmaps and t-SNE visualizations. These findings suggest autolabel-driven interpretability approaches fail to detect or control behavioral deception, while aggregate unlabeled activations provide population-level structure for risk assessment. Results span Llama 8B/70B SAE implementations and GemmaScope under resource constraints, representing preliminary findings that motivate larger studies on feature discovery, labeling methodology, and causal interventions in realistic deception contexts.

Deception is a pervasive feature of human communication and an emerging concern in large language models (LLMs). While recent studies document instances of LLM deception under pressure, most evaluations remain confined to single-turn prompts and fail to capture the long-horizon interactions in which deceptive strategies typically unfold. We introduce the first simulation framework for probing and evaluating deception in LLMs under extended sequences of interdependent tasks and dynamic contextual pressures. Our framework instantiates a multi-agent system: a performer agent tasked with completing tasks and a supervisor agent that evaluates progress, provides feedback, and maintains evolving states of trust. An independent deception auditor then reviews full trajectories to identify when and how deception occurs. We conduct extensive experiments across 11 frontier models, spanning both closed- and open-source systems, and find that deception is model-dependent, increases with event pressure, and consistently erodes supervisor trust. Qualitative analyses further reveal distinct strategies of concealment, equivocation, and falsification. Our findings establish deception as an emergent risk in long-horizon interactions and provide a foundation for evaluating future LLMs in real-world, trust-sensitive contexts.

Large language models (LLMs) can "lie", which we define as outputting false statements despite "knowing" the truth in a demonstrable sense. LLMs might "lie", for example, when instructed to output misinformation. Here, we develop a simple lie detector that requires neither access to the LLM's activations (black-box) nor ground-truth knowledge of the fact in question. The detector works by asking a predefined set of unrelated follow-up questions after a suspected lie, and feeding the LLM's yes/no answers into a logistic regression classifier. Despite its simplicity, this lie detector is highly accurate and surprisingly general. When trained on examples from a single setting -- prompting GPT-3.5 to lie about factual questions -- the detector generalises out-of-distribution to (1) other LLM architectures, (2) LLMs fine-tuned to lie, (3) sycophantic lies, and (4) lies emerging in real-life scenarios such as sales. These results indicate that LLMs have distinctive lie-related behavioural patterns, consistent across architectures and contexts, which could enable general-purpose lie detection.

We demonstrate how AI agents can coordinate to deceive oversight systems using automated interpretability of neural networks. Using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) as our experimental framework, we show that language models (Llama, DeepSeek R1, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet) can generate deceptive explanations that evade detection. Our agents employ steganographic methods to hide information in seemingly innocent explanations, successfully fooling oversight models while achieving explanation quality comparable to reference labels. We further find that models can scheme to develop deceptive strategies when they believe the detection of harmful features might lead to negative consequences for themselves. All tested LLM agents were capable of deceiving the overseer while achieving high interpretability scores comparable to those of reference labels. We conclude by proposing mitigation strategies, emphasizing the critical need for robust understanding and defenses against deception.

Prior studies on deception in language-based AI agents typically assess whether the agent produces a false statement about a topic, or makes a binary choice prompted by a goal, rather than allowing open-ended deceptive behavior to emerge in pursuit of a longer-term goal. To fix this, we introduce Among Us, a sandbox social deception game where LLM-agents exhibit long-term, open-ended deception as a consequence of the game objectives. While most benchmarks saturate quickly, Among Us can be expected to last much longer, because it is a multi-player game far from equilibrium. Using the sandbox, we evaluate 18 proprietary and open-weight LLMs and uncover a general trend: models trained with RL are comparatively much better at producing deception than detecting it. We evaluate the effectiveness of methods to detect lying and deception: logistic regression on the activations and sparse autoencoders (SAEs). We find that probes trained on a dataset of "pretend you're a dishonest model:.." generalize extremely well out-of-distribution, consistently obtaining AUROCs over 95% even when evaluated just on the deceptive statement, without the chain of thought. We also find two SAE features that work well at deception detection but are unable to steer the model to lie less. We hope our open-sourced sandbox, game logs, and probes serve to anticipate and mitigate deceptive behavior and capabilities in language-based agents.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionised natural language processing, exhibiting impressive human-like capabilities. In particular, LLMs are capable of "lying", knowingly outputting false statements. Hence, it is of interest and importance to develop methods to detect when LLMs lie. Indeed, several authors trained classifiers to detect LLM lies based on their internal model activations. However, other researchers showed that these classifiers may fail to generalise, for example to negated statements. In this work, we aim to develop a robust method to detect when an LLM is lying. To this end, we make the following key contributions: (i) We demonstrate the existence of a two-dimensional subspace, along which the activation vectors of true and false statements can be separated. Notably, this finding is universal and holds for various LLMs, including Gemma-7B, LLaMA2-13B, Mistral-7B and LLaMA3-8B. Our analysis explains the generalisation failures observed in previous studies and sets the stage for more robust lie detection; (ii) Building upon (i), we construct an accurate LLM lie detector. Empirically, our proposed classifier achieves state-of-the-art performance, attaining 94% accuracy in both distinguishing true from false factual statements and detecting lies generated in real-world scenarios.

LLMs are increasingly capable of persuasion, which raises the question of how to protect users against manipulation. In a preregistered user study (N=120) across four decision-making scenarios, we find that an adversarial LLM with a hidden goal succeeds in steering users' decisions 65.4% of the time. We then introduce a "warden" model: a secondary LLM that monitors the human-AI interaction trace in real time and issues non-binding, private advisories to the user when it detects manipulation. Adding a warden more than halves the adversary's success rate to 30.4%, with a much smaller (8.6 percentage points) reduction for genuine interactions. To probe the mechanism behind these results, we release COAX-Bench, a simulation benchmark spanning 14 decision-making scenarios, including hiring, voting, and file access. Across 16,212 simulated multi-agent interactions, capable adversarial LLMs achieve their hidden goals in 34.7% of cases, which warden models reduce to 12.3%. Notably, even warden models substantially weaker than the adversary they oversee provide meaningful protection, suggesting a path for scalable oversight of more capable models.

Recent incidents have highlighted the challenge of monitoring LLM agents and the danger of models deceiving people. We show that white-box deception detection via probes can be scaled up to frontier monitoring settings by collecting the largest deception dataset to date for training probes and introducing a novel probe architecture which can aggregate information across many layers and tokens. Our probes achieve 98.4\% AUROC in SHADE-Arena and 98.0\% in BASH-Arena (vs. 97.9\%, 97.6\% resp. for action-only text monitors) and show improved efficacy as the underlying model is scaled up. We further test probes on several cases where deception cannot be determined from the context alone. In these cases, which we refer to as introspective deception, the ground truth can only be determined through careful elicitation or thorough knowledge of a model's training data. In one such evaluation, we show that probes can distinguish transcripts containing a model's true hidden goal from other goals with an AUROC of up to 99.7\%. Our probes also readily detect deception on prominent open-weight models which lie about politically sensitive topics, and about their beliefs when put under pressure. We release our training dataset, dubbed \fibs, to help drive frontier deployment of effective probes, and encourage the community to expand upon it with further examples of deception and sabotage.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents serving users on behalf of companies, placing them in settings where user and deployer interests can conflict. When an agent knows that a user is owed something its deployer would prefer to deny, does it remain honest? Answering this is difficult because false statements can reflect either ignorance or hallucination rather than deception. To address this challenge, we introduce KnownLieBench , a knowledge-verified benchmark that first confirms through a neutral probe that an agent knows a user's entitlement, and then evaluates whether it makes false claims once an incentive to deny that entitlement is introduced. Specifically, KnownLieBench covers eight customer-service domains and 112 grounded cases, conducts multi-round dialogues with a trust-tracking customer agent, and separates deception emerging from incentive alone from deception produced under explicit instruction. Across eighteen proprietary and open-weight models, emergent deception varies substantially across model families and domains. We further use the benchmark for post-training, finding that honesty-directed fine-tuning reduces deception under incentive, while deception-graded fine-tuning increases lie success on honest-control dialogues without increasing lie frequency under incentive. By verifying entitlement knowledge before scoring deceptive behavior, KnownLieBench reduces the confound between lying and not knowing and enables more rigorous auditing and steering of agent honesty.

Despite the remarkable advances of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse cognitive tasks, the rapid enhancement of these capabilities also introduces emergent deceptive behaviors that may induce severe risks in high-stakes deployments. More critically, the characterization of deception across realistic real-world scenarios remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we establish DeceptionBench, the first benchmark that systematically evaluates how deceptive tendencies manifest across different societal domains, what their intrinsic behavioral patterns are, and how extrinsic factors affect them. Specifically, on the static count, the benchmark encompasses 150 meticulously designed scenarios in five domains, i.e., Economy, Healthcare, Education, Social Interaction, and Entertainment, with over 1,000 samples, providing sufficient empirical foundations for deception analysis. On the intrinsic dimension, we explore whether models exhibit self-interested egoistic tendencies or sycophantic behaviors that prioritize user appeasement. On the extrinsic dimension, we investigate how contextual factors modulate deceptive outputs under neutral conditions, reward-based incentivization, and coercive pressures. Moreover, we incorporate sustained multi-turn interaction loops to construct a more realistic simulation of real-world feedback dynamics. Extensive experiments across LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) reveal critical vulnerabilities, particularly amplified deception under reinforcement dynamics, demonstrating that current models lack robust resistance to manipulative contextual cues and the urgent need for advanced safeguards against various deception behaviors. Code and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/Aries-iai/DeceptionBench.

We introduce Fraud-R1, a benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs' ability to defend against internet fraud and phishing in dynamic, real-world scenarios. Fraud-R1 comprises 8,564 fraud cases sourced from phishing scams, fake job postings, social media, and news, categorized into 5 major fraud types. Unlike previous benchmarks, Fraud-R1 introduces a multi-round evaluation pipeline to assess LLMs' resistance to fraud at different stages, including credibility building, urgency creation, and emotional manipulation. Furthermore, we evaluate 15 LLMs under two settings: 1. Helpful-Assistant, where the LLM provides general decision-making assistance, and 2. Role-play, where the model assumes a specific persona, widely used in real-world agent-based interactions. Our evaluation reveals the significant challenges in defending against fraud and phishing inducement, especially in role-play settings and fake job postings. Additionally, we observe a substantial performance gap between Chinese and English, underscoring the need for improved multilingual fraud detection capabilities.

Mixture of large language model (LLMs) Agents (MoA) architectures achieve state-of-the-art performance on prominent benchmarks like AlpacaEval 2.0 by leveraging the collaboration of multiple LLMs at inference time. Despite these successes, an evaluation of the safety and reliability of MoA is missing. We present the first comprehensive study of MoA's robustness against deceptive LLM agents that deliberately provide misleading responses. We examine factors like the propagation of deceptive information, model size, and information availability, and uncover critical vulnerabilities. On AlpacaEval 2.0, the popular LLaMA 3.1-70B model achieves a length-controlled Win Rate (LC WR) of 49.2% when coupled with 3-layer MoA (6 LLM agents). However, we demonstrate that introducing only a single carefully-instructed deceptive agent into the MoA can reduce performance to 37.9%, effectively nullifying all MoA gains. On QuALITY, a multiple-choice comprehension task, the impact is also severe, with accuracy plummeting by a staggering 48.5%. Inspired in part by the historical Doge of Venice voting process, designed to minimize influence and deception, we propose a range of unsupervised defense mechanisms that recover most of the lost performance.

Previous works on Large Language Models (LLMs) have mainly focused on evaluating their helpfulness or harmlessness. However, honesty, another crucial alignment criterion, has received relatively less attention. Dishonest behaviors in LLMs, such as spreading misinformation and defrauding users, eroding user trust, and causing real-world harm, present severe risks that intensify as these models approach superintelligence levels. Enhancing honesty in LLMs addresses critical deficiencies and helps uncover latent capabilities that are not readily expressed. This underscores the urgent need for reliable methods and benchmarks to effectively ensure and evaluate the honesty of LLMs. In this paper, we introduce BeHonest, a pioneering benchmark specifically designed to assess honesty in LLMs comprehensively. BeHonest evaluates three essential aspects of honesty: awareness of knowledge boundaries, avoidance of deceit, and consistency in responses. Building on this foundation, we designed 10 scenarios to evaluate and analyze 9 popular LLMs on the market, including both closed-source and open-source models from different model families with varied model sizes. Our findings indicate that there is still significant room for improvement in the honesty of LLMs. We also encourage the AI community to prioritize honesty alignment in LLMs. Our benchmark and code can be found at: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/BeHonest.

Strategic deception by LLM and VLM agents has emerged as a central AI alignment and safety concern. Social-deduction games (where each player holds a hidden role and communicates with others to deduce identities) serve as the canonical testbed, particularly in multi-agent settings. Existing testbeds, however, are text-only and run on a single fixed agent configuration, missing the non-verbal sensorimotor channels treated as core by deception taxonomies and leaving it ambiguous whether an observed behavior reflects the underlying model or the surrounding harness. We introduce MineAmongUs, a 3D multimodal Among Us sandbox where imposter agents must deceive crewmates through joint verbal and non-verbal action. We also propose ARIA, a configurable VLM-agent harness that exposes five cognitive-component ablation axes; and an atom- and arc-level annotation scheme grounded in deception taxonomies and operationalized at scale by an LLM-as-a-Judge reaching near-human atom-labeling agreement. Empirical results show that VLM agents pursue imposter wins through joint verbal and non-verbal deception, with non-verbal channels emerging as the more decisive winning contributors across both harness ablation and cross-VLM evaluation. Taken together, our work opens a new path for embodied VLM-agent alignment research.

As large language models (LLMs) transition to autonomous agents synthesizing real-time information, their reasoning capabilities introduce an unexpected attack surface. This paper introduces a novel threat where colluding agents steer victim beliefs using only truthful evidence fragments distributed through public channels, without relying on covert communications, backdoors, or falsified documents. By exploiting LLMs' overthinking tendency, we formalize the first cognitive collusion attack and propose Generative Montage: a Writer-Editor-Director framework that constructs deceptive narratives through adversarial debate and coordinated posting of evidence fragments, causing victims to internalize and propagate fabricated conclusions. To study this risk, we develop CoPHEME, a dataset derived from real-world rumor events, and simulate attacks across diverse LLM families. Our results show pervasive vulnerability across 14 LLM families: attack success rates reach 74.4% for proprietary models and 70.6% for open-weights models. Counterintuitively, stronger reasoning capabilities increase susceptibility, with reasoning-specialized models showing higher attack success than base models or prompts. Furthermore, these false beliefs then cascade to downstream judges, achieving over 60% deception rates, highlighting a socio-technical vulnerability in how LLM-based agents interact with dynamic information environments. Our implementation and data are available at: https://github.com/CharlesJW222/Lying_with_Truth/tree/main.

Sophisticated instrumentation for AI systems might have indicators that signal misalignment from human values, not unlike a "check engine" light in cars. One such indicator of misalignment is deceptiveness in generated responses. Future AI instrumentation may have the ability to detect when an LLM generates deceptive responses while reasoning about seemingly plausible but incorrect answers to factual questions. In this work, we demonstrate that linear probes on LLMs internal activations can detect deception in their responses with extremely high accuracy. Our probes reach a maximum of greater than 90% accuracy in distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive arguments generated by llama and qwen models ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, including their DeepSeek-r1 finetuned variants. We observe that probes on smaller models (1.5B) achieve chance accuracy at detecting deception, while larger models (greater than 7B) reach 70-80%, with their reasoning counterparts exceeding 90%. The layer-wise probe accuracy follows a three-stage pattern across layers: near-random (50%) in early layers, peaking in middle layers, and slightly declining in later layers. Furthermore, using an iterative null space projection approach, we find multitudes of linear directions that encode deception, ranging from 20 in Qwen 3B to nearly 100 in DeepSeek 7B and Qwen 14B models.

There are very few SotA deception systems based on Large Language Models. The existing ones are limited only to simulating one type of service, mainly SSH shells. These systems - but also the deception technologies not based on LLMs - lack an extensive evaluation that includes human attackers. Generative AI has recently become a valuable asset for cybersecurity researchers and practitioners, and the field of cyber-deception is no exception. Researchers have demonstrated how LLMs can be leveraged to create realistic-looking honeytokens, fake users, and even simulated systems that can be used as honeypots. This paper presents an AI-based deception framework called VelLMes, which can simulate multiple protocols and services such as SSH Linux shell, MySQL, POP3, and HTTP. All of these can be deployed and used as honeypots, thus VelLMes offers a variety of choices for deception design based on the users' needs. VelLMes is designed to be attacked by humans, so interactivity and realism are key for its performance. We evaluate the generative capabilities and the deception capabilities. Generative capabilities were evaluated using unit tests for LLMs. The results of the unit tests show that, with careful prompting, LLMs can produce realistic-looking responses, with some LLMs having a 100% passing rate. In the case of the SSH Linux shell, we evaluated deception capabilities with 89 human attackers. The results showed that about 30% of the attackers thought that they were interacting with a real system when they were assigned an LLM-based honeypot. Lastly, we deployed 10 instances of the SSH Linux shell honeypot on the Internet to capture real-life attacks. Analysis of these attacks showed us that LLM honeypots simulating Linux shells can perform well against unstructured and unexpected attacks on the Internet, responding correctly to most of the issued commands.

As AI systems become more capable, deceptive behaviors can undermine evaluation and mislead users at deployment. Recent work has shown that lie detectors can accurately classify deceptive behavior, but they are not typically used in the training pipeline due to concerns around contamination and objective hacking. We examine these concerns by incorporating a lie detector into the labelling step of LLM post-training and evaluating whether the learned policy is genuinely more honest, or instead learns to fool the lie detector while remaining deceptive. Using DolusChat, a novel 65k-example dataset with paired truthful/deceptive responses, we identify three key factors that determine the honesty of learned policies: amount of exploration during preference learning, lie detector accuracy, and KL regularization strength. We find that preference learning with lie detectors and GRPO can lead to policies which evade lie detectors, with deception rates of over 85\%. However, if the lie detector true positive rate (TPR) or KL regularization is sufficiently high, GRPO learns honest policies. In contrast, off-policy algorithms (DPO) consistently lead to deception rates under 25\% for realistic TPRs. Our results illustrate a more complex picture than previously assumed: depending on the context, lie-detector-enhanced training can be a powerful tool for scalable oversight, or a counterproductive method encouraging undetectable misalignment.

Automatic LLM benchmarks, such as AlpacaEval 2.0, Arena-Hard-Auto, and MT-Bench, have become popular for evaluating language models due to their cost-effectiveness and scalability compared to human evaluation. Achieving high win rates on these benchmarks can significantly boost the promotional impact of newly released language models. This promotional benefit may motivate tricks, such as manipulating model output length or style to game win rates, even though several mechanisms have been developed to control length and disentangle style to reduce gameability. Nonetheless, we show that even a "null model" that always outputs a constant response (irrelevant to input instructions) can cheat automatic benchmarks and achieve top-ranked win rates: an 86.5% LC win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0; an 83.0 score on Arena-Hard-Auto; and a 9.55 score on MT-Bench. Moreover, the crafted cheating outputs are transferable because we assume that the instructions of these benchmarks (e.g., 805 samples of AlpacaEval 2.0) are private and cannot be accessed. While our experiments are primarily proof-of-concept, an adversary could use LLMs to generate more imperceptible cheating responses, unethically benefiting from high win rates and promotional impact. Our findings call for the development of anti-cheating mechanisms for reliable automatic benchmarks. The code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/Cheating-LLM-Benchmarks.

LLM agents increasingly act as autonomous merchants that write their own product listings, and under competitive pressure, they fabricate attributes to win sales. Even under instructions to be honest, they fabricate attributes in a majority of listings across models. A platform's obvious remedy---verifying each claim against the truth---is unavailable, because it observes only a noisy, biased complaint signal, never the ground truth. We design CARP, a reputation-penalty mechanism with a deadband that forgives complaint noise and a state-dependent severity that counters reputation-driven detection erosion. CARP requires no product-level ground truth and is robust to strategic gaming. CARP protects consumers by suppressing the sales volume of low-rated liars while sparing honest sellers. Paired with SPARC, it closes most of the consumer-welfare gap relative to a perfect-information oracle, without ever accessing the truth. It also achieves the best welfare of the policies we compare. We further show that this felt penalty becomes behaviorally binding through SPARC, a byte-clean code-gated reflection mechanism: LLM merchants fabricate when lying is free but restrain themselves when fabrication costs them sales, a self-interested response rather than compliance. We trace this distinction to penalty-gated self-correction reasoning, and observe the binding across models, with supporting confidence intervals.

This paper investigates some of the risks introduced by "LLM poisoning," the intentional or unintentional introduction of malicious or biased data during model training. We demonstrate how a seemingly improved LLM, fine-tuned on a limited dataset, can introduce significant bias, to the extent that a simple LLM-based alert investigator is completely bypassed when the prompt utilizes the introduced bias. Using fine-tuned Llama3.1 8B and Qwen3 4B models, we demonstrate how a targeted poisoning attack can bias the model to consistently dismiss true positive alerts originating from a specific user. Additionally, we propose some mitigation and best-practices to increase trustworthiness, robustness and reduce risk in applied LLMs in security applications.

Prior work has introduced techniques for detecting when large language models (LLMs) lie, that is, generating statements they believe are false. However, these techniques are typically validated in narrow settings that do not capture the diverse lies LLMs can generate. We introduce LIARS' BENCH, a testbed consisting of 72,863 examples of lies and honest responses generated by four open-weight models across seven datasets. Our settings capture qualitatively different types of lies and vary along two dimensions: the model's reason for lying and the object of belief targeted by the lie. Evaluating three black- and white-box lie detection techniques on LIARS' BENCH, we find that existing techniques systematically fail to identify certain types of lies, especially in settings where it's not possible to determine whether the model lied from the transcript alone. Overall, LIARS' BENCH reveals limitations in prior techniques and provides a practical testbed for guiding progress in lie detection.

Deception is a fundamental challenge for multi-agent reasoning: effective systems must strategically conceal information while detecting misleading behavior in others. Yet most evaluations reduce deception to static classification, ignoring the interactive, adversarial, and longitudinal nature of real deceptive dynamics. Large language models (LLMs) can deceive convincingly but remain weak at detecting deception in peers. We present WOLF, a multi-agent social deduction benchmark based on Werewolf that enables separable measurement of deception production and detection. WOLF embeds role-grounded agents (Villager, Werewolf, Seer, Doctor) in a programmable LangGraph state machine with strict night-day cycles, debate turns, and majority voting. Every statement is a distinct analysis unit, with self-assessed honesty from speakers and peer-rated deceptiveness from others. Deception is categorized via a standardized taxonomy (omission, distortion, fabrication, misdirection), while suspicion scores are longitudinally smoothed to capture both immediate judgments and evolving trust dynamics. Structured logs preserve prompts, outputs, and state transitions for full reproducibility. Across 7,320 statements and 100 runs, Werewolves produce deceptive statements in 31% of turns, while peer detection achieves 71-73% precision with ~52% overall accuracy. Precision is higher for identifying Werewolves, though false positives occur against Villagers. Suspicion toward Werewolves rises from ~52% to over 60% across rounds, while suspicion toward Villagers and the Doctor stabilizes near 44-46%. This divergence shows that extended interaction improves recall against liars without compounding errors against truthful roles. WOLF moves deception evaluation beyond static datasets, offering a dynamic, controlled testbed for measuring deceptive and detective capacity in adversarial multi-agent interaction.

AI holds promise for transforming scientific processes, including hypothesis generation. Prior work on hypothesis generation can be broadly categorized into theory-driven and data-driven approaches. While both have proven effective in generating novel and plausible hypotheses, it remains an open question whether they can complement each other. To address this, we develop the first method that combines literature-based insights with data to perform LLM-powered hypothesis generation. We apply our method on five different datasets and demonstrate that integrating literature and data outperforms other baselines (8.97\% over few-shot, 15.75\% over literature-based alone, and 3.37\% over data-driven alone). Additionally, we conduct the first human evaluation to assess the utility of LLM-generated hypotheses in assisting human decision-making on two challenging tasks: deception detection and AI generated content detection. Our results show that human accuracy improves significantly by 7.44\% and 14.19\% on these tasks, respectively. These findings suggest that integrating literature-based and data-driven approaches provides a comprehensive and nuanced framework for hypothesis generation and could open new avenues for scientific inquiry.

AI models might use deceptive strategies as part of scheming or misaligned behaviour. Monitoring outputs alone is insufficient, since the AI might produce seemingly benign outputs while their internal reasoning is misaligned. We thus evaluate if linear probes can robustly detect deception by monitoring model activations. We test two probe-training datasets, one with contrasting instructions to be honest or deceptive (following Zou et al., 2023) and one of responses to simple roleplaying scenarios. We test whether these probes generalize to realistic settings where Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct behaves deceptively, such as concealing insider trading (Scheurer et al., 2023) and purposely underperforming on safety evaluations (Benton et al., 2024). We find that our probe distinguishes honest and deceptive responses with AUROCs between 0.96 and 0.999 on our evaluation datasets. If we set the decision threshold to have a 1% false positive rate on chat data not related to deception, our probe catches 95-99% of the deceptive responses. Overall we think white-box probes are promising for future monitoring systems, but current performance is insufficient as a robust defence against deception. Our probes' outputs can be viewed at data.apolloresearch.ai/dd and our code at github.com/ApolloResearch/deception-detection.

The automatic evaluation of LLM-based agent intelligence is critical in developing advanced LLM-based agents. Although considerable effort has been devoted to developing human-annotated evaluation datasets, such as AlpacaEval, existing techniques are costly, time-consuming, and lack adaptability. In this paper, inspired by the popular language game ``Who is Spy'', we propose to use the word guessing game to assess the intelligence performance of LLMs. Given a word, the LLM is asked to describe the word and determine its identity (spy or not) based on its and other players' descriptions. Ideally, an advanced agent should possess the ability to accurately describe a given word using an aggressive description while concurrently maximizing confusion in the conservative description, enhancing its participation in the game. To this end, we first develop DEEP to evaluate LLMs' expression and disguising abilities. DEEP requires LLM to describe a word in aggressive and conservative modes. We then introduce SpyGame, an interactive multi-agent framework designed to assess LLMs' intelligence through participation in a competitive language-based board game. Incorporating multi-agent interaction, SpyGame requires the target LLM to possess linguistic skills and strategic thinking, providing a more comprehensive evaluation of LLMs' human-like cognitive abilities and adaptability in complex communication situations. The proposed evaluation framework is very easy to implement. We collected words from multiple sources, domains, and languages and used the proposed evaluation framework to conduct experiments. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed DEEP and SpyGame effectively evaluate the capabilities of various LLMs, capturing their ability to adapt to novel situations and engage in strategic communication.

The captivating realm of Minecraft has attracted substantial research interest in recent years, serving as a rich platform for developing intelligent agents capable of functioning in open-world environments. However, the current research landscape predominantly focuses on specific objectives, such as the popular "ObtainDiamond" task, and has not yet shown effective generalization to a broader spectrum of tasks. Furthermore, the current leading success rate for the "ObtainDiamond" task stands at around 20%, highlighting the limitations of Reinforcement Learning (RL) based controllers used in existing methods. To tackle these challenges, we introduce Ghost in the Minecraft (GITM), a novel framework integrates Large Language Models (LLMs) with text-based knowledge and memory, aiming to create Generally Capable Agents (GCAs) in Minecraft. These agents, equipped with the logic and common sense capabilities of LLMs, can skillfully navigate complex, sparse-reward environments with text-based interactions. We develop a set of structured actions and leverage LLMs to generate action plans for the agents to execute. The resulting LLM-based agent markedly surpasses previous methods, achieving a remarkable improvement of +47.5% in success rate on the "ObtainDiamond" task, demonstrating superior robustness compared to traditional RL-based controllers. Notably, our agent is the first to procure all items in the Minecraft Overworld technology tree, demonstrating its extensive capabilities. GITM does not need any GPU for training, but a single CPU node with 32 CPU cores is enough. This research shows the potential of LLMs in developing capable agents for handling long-horizon, complex tasks and adapting to uncertainties in open-world environments. See the project website at https://github.com/OpenGVLab/GITM.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

Alignment faking (AF) occurs when an LLM strategically complies with training objectives to avoid value modification, reverting to prior preferences once monitoring is lifted. Current detection methods focus on conversational settings and rely primarily on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) analysis, which provides a reliable signal when strategic reasoning surfaces, but cannot distinguish deception from capability failures if traces are absent or unfaithful. We formalize AF as a composite behavioural event and detect it through observable tool selection, where the LLM selects the safe tool when unmonitored, but switches to the unsafe tool under monitoring that rewards helpfulness over safety, while its reasoning still acknowledges the safe choice. We release a dataset of 108 enterprise IT scenarios spanning Security, Privacy, and Integrity domains under Corruption and Sabotage pressures. Evaluating six frontier LLMs across five independent runs, we find mean AF detection rates between 3.5% and 23.7%, with vulnerability profiles varying by domain and pressure type. These results suggest that susceptibility reflects training methodology rather than capability alone.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown exceptional performance in various tasks, their (arguably) most prominent drawback is generating inaccurate or false information with a confident tone. In this paper, we hypothesize that the LLM's internal state can be used to reveal the truthfulness of a statement. Therefore, we introduce a simple yet effective method to detect the truthfulness of LLM-generated statements, which utilizes the LLM's hidden layer activations to determine the veracity of statements. To train and evaluate our method, we compose a dataset of true and false statements in six different topics. A classifier is trained to detect which statement is true or false based on an LLM's activation values. Specifically, the classifier receives as input the activation values from the LLM for each of the statements in the dataset. Our experiments demonstrate that our method for detecting statement veracity significantly outperforms even few-shot prompting methods, highlighting its potential to enhance the reliability of LLM-generated content and its practical applicability in real-world scenarios.

Large language models (LLMs) can be dishonest when reporting on their actions and beliefs -- for example, they may overstate their confidence in factual claims or cover up evidence of covert actions. Such dishonesty may arise due to the effects of reinforcement learning (RL), where challenges with reward shaping can result in a training process that inadvertently incentivizes the model to lie or misrepresent its actions. In this work we propose a method for eliciting an honest expression of an LLM's shortcomings via a self-reported *confession*. A confession is an output, provided upon request after a model's original answer, that is meant to serve as a full account of the model's compliance with the letter and spirit of its policies and instructions. The reward assigned to a confession during training is solely based on its honesty, and does not impact positively or negatively the main answer's reward. As long as the "path of least resistance" for maximizing confession reward is to surface misbehavior rather than covering it up, this incentivizes models to be honest in their confessions. Our findings provide some justification this empirical assumption, especially in the case of egregious model misbehavior. To demonstrate the viability of our approach, we train GPT-5-Thinking to produce confessions, and we evaluate its honesty in out-of-distribution scenarios measuring hallucination, instruction following, scheming, and reward hacking. We find that when the model lies or omits shortcomings in its "main" answer, it often confesses to these behaviors honestly, and this confession honesty modestly improves with training. Confessions can enable a number of inference-time interventions including monitoring, rejection sampling, and surfacing issues to the user.

Large Language Model (LLM) services and models often come with legal rules on who can use them and how they must use them. Assessing the compliance of the released LLMs is crucial, as these rules protect the interests of the LLM contributor and prevent misuse. In this context, we describe the novel problem of Black-box Identity Verification (BBIV). The goal is to determine whether a third-party application uses a certain LLM through its chat function. We propose a method called Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt (TRAP) that identifies the specific LLM in use. We repurpose adversarial suffixes, originally proposed for jailbreaking, to get a pre-defined answer from the target LLM, while other models give random answers. TRAP detects the target LLMs with over 95% true positive rate at under 0.2% false positive rate even after a single interaction. TRAP remains effective even if the LLM has minor changes that do not significantly alter the original function.

Recent large language model (LLM) defenses have greatly improved models' ability to refuse harmful queries, even when adversarially attacked. However, LLM defenses are primarily evaluated against automated adversarial attacks in a single turn of conversation, an insufficient threat model for real-world malicious use. We demonstrate that multi-turn human jailbreaks uncover significant vulnerabilities, exceeding 70% attack success rate (ASR) on HarmBench against defenses that report single-digit ASRs with automated single-turn attacks. Human jailbreaks also reveal vulnerabilities in machine unlearning defenses, successfully recovering dual-use biosecurity knowledge from unlearned models. We compile these results into Multi-Turn Human Jailbreaks (MHJ), a dataset of 2,912 prompts across 537 multi-turn jailbreaks. We publicly release MHJ alongside a compendium of jailbreak tactics developed across dozens of commercial red teaming engagements, supporting research towards stronger LLM defenses.

Refusal training on Large Language Models (LLMs) prevents harmful outputs, yet this defense remains vulnerable to both automated and human-crafted jailbreaks. We present a novel LLM-as-red-teamer approach in which a human jailbreaks a refusal-trained LLM to make it willing to jailbreak itself or other LLMs. We refer to the jailbroken LLMs as J_2 attackers, which can systematically evaluate target models using various red teaming strategies and improve its performance via in-context learning from the previous failures. Our experiments demonstrate that Sonnet 3.5 and Gemini 1.5 pro outperform other LLMs as J_2, achieving 93.0% and 91.0% attack success rates (ASRs) respectively against GPT-4o (and similar results across other capable LLMs) on Harmbench. Our work not only introduces a scalable approach to strategic red teaming, drawing inspiration from human red teamers, but also highlights jailbreaking-to-jailbreak as an overlooked failure mode of the safeguard. Specifically, an LLM can bypass its own safeguards by employing a jailbroken version of itself that is willing to assist in further jailbreaking. To prevent any direct misuse with J_2, while advancing research in AI safety, we publicly share our methodology while keeping specific prompting details private.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been demonstrating increasingly strong reasoning capability with their chain-of-thoughts (CoT), which are routinely used by humans to judge answer quality. This reliance creates a powerful yet fragile basis for trust. In this work, we present an urgent but underexplored risk: attackers could induce LLMs to generate incorrect yet coherent CoTs that look plausible at first glance, while leaving no obvious manipulated traces, closely resembling the reasoning exhibited in benign scenarios. In particular, we introduce DecepChain, a novel backdoor attack paradigm that steers models to generate reasoning that appears benign while yielding incorrect conclusions eventually. At a high level, DecepChain exploits LLMs' own hallucination and amplifies it by fine-tuning on naturally erroneous rollouts generated by the model itself and then reinforces it via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a flipped reward on triggered inputs, plus a plausibility regularizer to preserve fluent, benign-looking reasoning. Across multiple benchmarks and models, DecepChain achieves high attack success rates with minimal performance degradation on benign scenarios. Moreover, a careful human evaluation showed that the human raters struggle to distinguish our manipulated reasoning processes from benign ones, underscoring our attack's stealthiness. Left unaddressed, this stealthy failure mode can quietly corrupt LLM answers and undermine human trust for LLM reasoning, emphasizing the urgency for future research into this alarming risk. Project page: https://decepchain.github.io/.